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Purposes of the mission
From 24 March to 6 April a mission, composed of two members of INTERTECT 
and. one staff member of UNHCR, visited Somalia to review the emergency 
operations. The objectives were:
1. To examine the emergency operations in order to study how UNHCR res­
ponds to situations of this type and to observe the procedures, staffing and 
methods of operating by which UNHCR responds to an emergency situation.
2. To assess the operational capabilities of UNHCR in the Somalia opera­
tion and to draw out the lessons learned for future relief operations in 
similar environments and circumstances.
Specifically, the mission was concerned with the following:
A. Preparedness of UNHCR for the emergency;
E. Operations planning;
C. Decentralization of decision-making;
D. Staffing patterns;
E. Co-ordination with voluntary organizations as implementing partners;
F. Information requirements.
The Somalia case study is part of a comprehensive study on emergency 
preparedness and response capabilities of UNHCR as outlined in PCS/4H  of 
26 July 1979 and the terms of reference in PCS/551 dated 23 November 1979.
II. Summary of Major Points
A. Preparedness of HCR
The Somalia operation was essentially an emergency that developed from 
a long-term, almost static, refugee situation. The experience in Somalia 
shows that HCR was not prepared to deal with this type of situation. Not 
only was response to the emergency, when it was identified, slow, there was 
no accurate means of determining that 0. change in the static situation was 
developing. There were no surveillance procedures in place or monitoring 
of the normal indicators that would show that there was a change and a 
growing problem. When the situation was recognized for what it was by the 
Branch Office, it then took months for the HCR bureaucracy to respond 
properly. When it was realised that a large number of new refugees were 
arriving, the staff was unprepared for a proper assessment of the situe-tion, 
which would lead to a proper and timely response.
In order to be prepared for this type of emergency, HCR should estab­
lish procedures for monitoring a situation and establish indicators that 
will quickly provide administrators with information relating to emergency 
needs. In short, HCR must provide information and training to field officers 
on how to assess, where to assess and what to assess, in order to 
pinpoint needs.
The experience in Somalia also underscores the need for HCR to develop 
the capability of monitoilng events on a region-wide basis, especially 
where potential conflict between countries may lead to an emergency operation. 
The events that led to this emergency were known far in advance of the 
arrival of the new refugees end adequate forewarning was given so that the 
emergency measures could have been taken prior to the time when the situation 
became difficult to handle.
The Somalia experience also indicates that field officers are not 
prepared to deal with the technical aspects of refugee needs assessment.
At the time the emergency started, the professional staff consisted of no 
more than two men, neither of whom has had prior experience or training 
in needs assessment. While various missions were sent from HQ to assist 
in determining needs, the information provided was general and not specific 
enough to assist in the specifics of programme development. In order to 
assist the Government and implementing partners adequately, HCR must 
develop adequate assessment capability, either through training field 
officers or by developing a team of assessment specialists Reliance on
3voluntary agencies and the Government to carry out this assessment proved, 
in the Somalia case, to he unsatisfactory.
B. Operations piannin g
The Somalia experience has underscored the fact that UNHCR is unprepared 
for adequate operations planning, either for its own staff and operations 
needs or to advise counterparts and the host Government. While in general 
the staff does understand that certain tasks are required, or that certain 
staff positions must he filled, the specific duties and requirements of 
each position are poorly delineated. Management principles, procedures 
and methods are not known, or not understood. Even some of the most basic 
concepts, such as standardization, pooling and flow charting are not 
practised.
The principles end procedures of operations management are not difficult 
to master. Guidelines can he formulated, procedures can be developed and 
the proper forms printed, and the basic training in operations planning for 
managers can he instituted, thereby achieving a much higher range of re­
sults. UNHCR can he expected to confront a wide range of operational circum­
stances in the future; even when not in an operational situation, HCR will 
he expected to advise counterparts and/or the host Government on setting up 
and managing operations. To improve proficiency, the organization should pro­
vide basic operations planning and management skills to potential heads and 
staffs of field offices, develop a small corps of operations experts to 
assist, on a temporary basis, Branch Offices in setting up emergency opera­
tions and establish procedures whereby these operations can be easily and 
swiftly administered and monitored.
C. Decentralization of decision-making
It is recognized that the highly political and sensitive nature of 
situations such as Somalia requires the closest co-ordination between 
Headquarters and. the Branch Office. Nonetheless, in order to respond 
adequately to emergency needs, greater delegation of authority should be 
made to the HCR official who is on the spot. Many of the weaknesses and 
shortcomings of NCR's programme in Somalia are directly attributable to 
this lack of authority. The problems relating to staffing and procurement 
are particular areas of concern in the Somalia operation. In order for 
HCR to be effective in its emergency response, one or a combination of
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the following should occur: all or portions of the procedures in BAPI
should he waived or streamlined, or simplified procedures should go 
into effect or new procedures designed especially for the emergency 
situations should temporarily supercede
D. Staffing patterns
Many of the problems related to adequate assessment of the situation 
and deficiencies in the planning of support operations for the refugees 
can be attributed to the fact that HCR does not have on its staff techni­
cians who can provide advice and immediate support in the technical fields 
during an emergency. Traditionally HCR has relied on voluntary agencies 
or consultants to fill this ga.p. The experience in Somalia shows that the 
voluntary agencies can provide only a limited range of technical services.
In many cases, the staff provided are inexperienced or improperly trained 
to deal with conditions in developing countries. HCR must have a small 
team of people whom it can rely upon to provide information and advice 
appropriate to the needs of refugees in developing countries. HCR should 
either retain such personnel in-house, or develop a special arrangement 
whereby such personnel can be seconded almost instantaneously to a Branch 
Office when an emergency develops. The latter option will require a 
much more specific arrangement than simply a roster of experts or a 
series of standing agreements with voluntary agencies. The technical 
experts must work together as a team and have complementary skills, 
otherwise the situiition will not be rectified.
E. Co-ordination with voluntary agencies as implementing partners
The diverse range of experience, qualifications and capabilities 
of the agencies chosen to implement HCR's programmes in Somalia demon­
strates the need for HCR to develop mechanisms whereby a higher quality 
and level of service can be provided on a fairly uniform basis for the 
refugees. The disparity between levels of service in the various camps 
provided under the auspices of different voluntary agencies shows that 
HCR must not only strive to ascertain that agencies are competent in 
their assigned work, but also provide a uniform standard of service as well as 
a basic minimal level of service to the refugees. In order to do this,
HCR should do three things: l) develop model minimum standards for each
refugee camp operation carried out by a voluntary agency or other entity
5contracted and/or paid for by HCR; 2) develop an assessment capability to 
monitor the effectiveness of voluntary agency progro.mmes carried out under 
the auspices of HCR; 3) develop a screening process for determining the 
competence of the voluntary agencies and their key field personnel prior 
to their being contracted by HCR.
F. Information requirements
Many of the problems in the specific operations in Somalia are related 
to the lack of information available to the staff and the implementing 
agencies; not even the standard references on refugee camp operations, nor 
the basic manuals developed for this type of emergency, nor the pamphlets 
and training aids that are utilized by many other agencies world-wide, 
were available in Somalia. In order to be more effective and to place 
a greater range of information in the hands of the administrators, HCR 
should: l) develop a field officers’ handbook of information that would
be required for emergency operations; 2) develop a basic library of infor­
mation on field operations, and provide it in multiple copies to Branch 
Offices; 3) establish links to information centres such as VITA, the 
Intermediate Technology Development Group, the Oxford Polytechnic Disaster 
Reference Service and the INTERTECT Disaster Information Service.
III. Summary of specific lessons from Somalia 
A. Administrat ion
i. The role of HCR
Lessons and implications for emergency preparedness - It is clear from 'this 
experience that HCR will often he called upon to take an active though not 
completely operational, role in emergency operations. There are various levels, 
or increments, of involvement, beginning with the traditional passive roles 
of HCR, moving to more active funding and technical assistance roles, and 
ultimately a fully operational role. A changing situation may require an 
escalation of involvement beyond that foreseen in the initial stages. Thus 
training and management systems should he developed which take into account 
the possibilities of incremental levels of involvement and define specific 
parameters and activities at each level.
2. Organizing the field staff *
Lessons learned and implications for 
preparing tables of organization should 
Handbook prepared for field officers and 
in the staff training programme.
emergency preparedness - Cuidance on 
oe‘•included in an Emergency Operations 
Branch Offices, and should be included
3. Recruiting local staff
* Lessons 1 corned ■•aid implications for emergency preparedness - The personnel
employment practices of HCR do not facilitate emergency response. There are 
three options for improving the situation:
a. Waiving the existing procedures during the initial stages and granting 
authority to the Branch Office to hire a limited number of staff on the spot;
b. Revising or streamlining the existing procedures;
c. Developing alternative procedures that can go into effect once an emer­
gency has been declared by the High Commissioner.
In most of the developing countries a variety of technical personnel can 
bo found working on development projects. These often make excellent temporary 
additions to an emergency operations staff. If the above changes arc under­
taken, HCR can more easily take advantage of this resource.
Denotes a finding comparable to a recommendation of the Bangkok seminar.
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74. Job specifications for field operations
Lessons and implications for emergency preparednes s - Sa.rnpio job s pe c i f ica-V* »
tions should be developed and included in a'Handbook for Emergency Operations 
for the field staff, and guidance should be provided as to the specific 
technical fields and roles of technicians that correspond to resolution of 
specific relief problems. In short, it is not adequate simply to request 
an engineer: one must know the specific type of engineer to request in
order to match the appropriate professional to the problem.
5* Monitoring
Lessons and implications for emergency preparedness - UNHCR should develop 
model accounting and monitoring systems for use by implementing partners, 
which provide information in a form that can be used both to monitor the 
existing situation and to forecast future needs. Furthermore, HCR must 
provide staff training on what the indicators are that point to potential 
problems, and how to develop and verify data to assess future needs.
6. Communications and field reporting
Lessons and implications for emergency preparedness - UNHCR should develop 
standardized reporting procedures for field operations, and train field 
officers on what types of information to communicate and hov; to weight the 
messages in such a way as to clarify their relative importance during trans­
mission. When extraordinary messages are sent, they can then receive the 
proper attention. Communi cat ions discipline must be established and rnainta.ined 
in order to reduce .overall confusion and to ensure that priority messages 
receive proper note.
* The remoteness of -the refugee camps in Somalia argues for the development
of a variety of radio communications systems, which could be identified and 
acquired by UNHCR and stockpiled for emergency operations use. Experience has 
shown, however, that governments are often reluctant to allow radio equipment 
in politically sensitive areas. Therefore, UNHCR should identify those 
frequencies that could be used and include the use of this eqiipment - at 
the specified frequencies - as part of the operations agreement signed with 
the Government in the initial stages of the operation.
7. Procurement
Lessons learned end implications for emergency pro pare cine go. - Procurement 
is one of the major activities of UNHCR in-field operations. The normal pro­
curement procedures must he waived or extensively streamlined, and emergency 
procedures must he established that decentralize procurement authority to the 
Branch Office. However, if this is to be successful, HCR must also•establish 
purchasing systems and procedures.to ensure that local purchasing not only 
enables the Office to respond quickly but also provides information for 
monitoring the flow of goods through the system from the time they are pur­
chased to the time they a.rrive in the hands of the refugees, as well as pro­
viding data that will enable the Office to monitor consumption and establish 
contingency planning.
The lack of information on the status of requests and relief goods in 
the pipeline underscores another problem facing HCR: if HCR is not operationa
the Government or voluntary agencies will develop and use their own procure­
ment and logistic systems. As most of these agencies do not have systems 
designed to provide information for use in contingency planning, it is 
often difficult for HCR - and indeed all the participants - to gather 
accurate information on material aid. HCR should therefore develop a model 
system, which can be provided to the Government and/or the implementing 
agencies, which will systematically provide information on the status of
relief supplies. This should be given to implementors at the initial stages o 
the operation, so that it can be institutionalized before the other systems 
that would not provide the necessary information can be put into effect.
8. Logistics
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - Logistics 
are not necessarily complicated. There are standard transport equations and 
tables for planning, end systems and forms for monitoring that can easily be 
adapted for use by HCR. A model system should be chosen and included in a 
handbook for field officers on emergency operations, so that an effective 
method can be employed early in the operation. When an operation reaches a 




Lessons 1 oarnoc! and implications for emergenoy prop. • red r.oss — To the
greatest extent possible, field offices should standardize vehicle purchases 
and, where necessary, develop the capacity to provide maintenance for 
vehicles used by KCR and counterpart agencies.
In situations where imported vehicl.es not used locally are required, 
vehicle maintenance agreements should bo developed with the manufacturer's 
representatives. A number of companies such as Toyota, Nissan Motors and 
Volkswagen have trained personnel who can o’e contracted to provide complete 
vehicular maintenance services in special situations. UNHCR should contact 
the various manufacturers and establish prior agreements whereby maintenance 
teams could be sent to an area where maintenance facilities are lacking.
10. Accounting
Lessons learned .and implications for emergency preparedness - When an 
emergency is encountered, the Branch Office should be supplemented with an. 
accountant and a specialized emergency accounting system should be instituted. 
A number of model systems, appropriate to specific types of operations, should 
be developed in advance and should be included in an Emergency Operations 
Handbook for field officers.
11. Procedures
Lessons learned one implications for emergency props redness - Among the 
critical areas cited by the Branch Office in which improvements are recommended, 
are:
a. the speed-up of processing of Letters of Instruction;
b. the need to increase authorization for immediate local expenditures 
to comparative UN levels (for example, the UNDP ResRep can commit up to 
US$400,000 without authorization from its Headquarters. It was pointed out 
that, were it not for the implementing partners, no purchases could have 
been made until several months after the emergency was identified.)
(
When an
12. Resources for emergencies
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - 
emergency occurs, the local staff must be supplemented by personnel who have 
experience in technical assistance matters. In some instances, trained 
technicians should be added to the staff immediately in order to provide 
assistance to the Branch Office until implementing partners con be identified 
and brought in to conduct the field operations in various sectors. In order 
to facilitate technical assistance, several items were needed, including a 
resource index, a field library with basic information relating to technical 
assistance requirements, and guides to operational issues. A list of volun­
tary agencies and their specialities and capabilities, as well as private 
companies and research institutions with specialized capabilities in the 
relief or development fields, should also be provided. Orientation concemin 
basic technical assistance and related issues should be provided in a 
professional development course for potential field officers and branch 
managers,
13. Operational capabilities
Lessons learned end implications for emergency -preparedness - In order to 
improve the operational capabilities of HCR and provide a balanced team for
the emergency, two actions are recommended (in addition to those outlined 
earlier under ’'staffing”):
a. . When an emergency is declared, a small team of specialists should be 
sent from Geneva to supplement the field staff; this team should ho a corps 
of specialists from within HCR who are field-oriented (the field staff of 
the Somali operation concurs with the report of the Bangkok Seminar, that
an emergency action group coordinated within the appropriate Regional Section 
of HCR during emergencies should provide this type of support,)
b. The capabilities of HCR staff in emergency operations should be 
enhanced through a professional development programme wherein disaster 
management training is provided as well as orientation as to how to conduct 
field operations. The latter is currently provided to a limited extent to 
now staff in HCR; it is felt, however, that a more rigorous professional 
development programme should be instituted for the staff who are likely to 
become representatives or programme officers in a disaster area. This 
training should be provided on a recurrent basis, so that new information 
and techniques, as well as the experience of past operations, can be brought 




14. Improving liaison with voluntary agencies
Lessons learned and implications for emergency prep-irodn ess - The objectives 
of liaison with voluntary organizations working with or under HCR should be:
a. . To ensure that all refugees receive a basic minimal standard of support 
and services;
b. To co-ordinate the services offered by the voluntary ayencics to 
ensure that no ga.ps in the services or levels of services occur;
c. To ensure that all refugees, receive equal services.
To accomplish these .aims, HCR should:
a. Provide leadership and direction through participation in voluntary 
agency programme planning;
b. Provide technico.l information, such as a centra.l library on relief 
operat ions and p ro gra m rn e s;
c. Institute ongoing information sharing activities at all levels such 
as regular coordination meetings, seminars, and provision of technical per­
sonnel to informally assess voluntary agency programmes.
d. Develop, with participation of the voluntary agencies, uniform 
standards and policies for the programmes being carried out by the voluntary 
agencies.
To be prepared for these activities, HCR should:
a. Develop a set of model standards which cun be used by the Drench 
Office as a guide for developing local standards.
b. Compile a mini reference library of technical information for use 
by Branch Offices.
15. Improving liaison with the host Government
Lessons learned and implications for emergency oreoa,redness - To be effect 
ive in liaison with a host government, two levels of involvement are re­
quired: political and technical. The political is not subject to any
standard rules and each case must be dealt with individually. On the techni­
cal level, HCR can be more effective by being prepared to deal with the 
technical issues and problems that arise (ond in many cases, in the routine 
day-to-day contact with a government, it is the technical questions that 
predominate). The steps required in order for HCR to improve its technical 
liaison capabilities arc generally the same as those recommended for 1I:,_ 
proving liaison with voluntary agencies.
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B. Camp operations
1. Siting of refugee camps
Lessons learned r:nd irnnllections for emergency preparedness - Simple 
information on camp planning practices and the siting of camps along river 
streams is available from a number of sources, including WHO, several- 
voluntary agencies, and INTERTECT. Information of this type can be collected 
and provided to the Government or counterpart agencies immediately upon the 
outbreak of an emergency situation. This type of information can also be 
provided in an Emergency Operations Handbook.
2. Water
Lessons learned, and implications for ernermoncy preparedness - UNHCR 
should identify, in advance, water resource1 'development experts and organiza­
tions with the equipment and sta.ff to develop and protect water resources and 
send them to the site at the outset of an emergency operation.
3- Sanitation
Lessons learned cand implications for emergency preparedness - Sanitation 
must bo stressed in operations preparedness. One of the very first installa­
tions in a refugee camp should be the latrine system, and all HCR field 
staff should continually stress the importance of sanitation to the counter­
part and implementing agencies. Guidelines for planning refugee camps 
should be established and a specific line item for sanitation facilities 
and equipment should he prominently displayed on the budget forms. Beyond 
this, HCR can take other measures; great strides have recently been made 
in developing sanitation units, such as the A quo. privy and the 0XFA1I sanita­
tion unit, for refugee co.mp usage. HCR should develop models of its own 
choosing and arrange in advance for mass production of these units ; also, 
standing orders should oe arranged so that large quantities con be provided 
by the rnonufe.cturer at short notice.
Adequate sanitation also requires an active vector control programme, 
especially to control flics. In the early stages of an operation, before 
latrines ar.e installed, vector control can play an important part in 
controlling disease, especially in situations where the open environment
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is used for defecation. Controlling the flies that would "breed in the 
waste material can buy time until a complete sanitation system is in­
stalled. for preparedness, HCR should identify suppliers of hand—sprayers 
end trie appropriate chemicals, end procure and send them during the 
initial stages to the Branch Office.
4. Garbage disposal
Lessons 1 coined, and Implications for emergency ore pc redness - Garbage 
collection is usually one of the areas most overlooked, in providing a 
safe environment in a refugee camp. The disposal of medical waste, in 
particular, is an area, that needs adequate fore-thought end planning.
This, of course, should he the concern of the implementing partner - 
indeed, most professional agencies would have the proper facilities and 
take proper core to see that waste disposal was carried out. It should, 
he a function of HCR to check with agencies to make sure that adequate 
provisions arc being undertaken. This, as well as other inspections of 
the activities carried, out by counterparts and implementing agencies, 
should be part of a routine inspection checklist for comp operations.
C. Feeding and nutrition
1. Basic rations
Lessons learned end implications for emergency preparedness - normal roles 
for HCR in basic rations are:
- To assist the host government in assessing needs;
- To formulate appeals for food;
- To coordinate donations;
- To provide logistics support when fooc£“arrives.
Of these, HCR has no standardized system for needs assessment, especially 
in formulating caloric and nutrient content requirements, nor a.ro staff mem­
bers cognizant of the basic issues in nutrition; the formulation of appeals 
is imprecise due to the lack of knowledge about local nutritional and feed­
ing habits; the ability to coordinate donations is limited by lack of moni­
toring capability; and logistics support is limited to purchasing vehicles.
An additional role which UNHCR should, play is advising the Government 
on record keeping and monitoring of food supplies but this cannot be accorn-
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piished at present due to a lhck of experienced or trained personnel and 
model systems.
If HCR is to be effective in each ofv.thesc roles, it must take appro­
priate action to rectify these deficiencies. While many of these tasks can 
be delegated to WFP or other implementing agencies, HCR must retain the 
capability of making credible evaluations of the contractors’ performance.
2. Supplementary feeding 
•
Lessons I corned end Implications for emergency preparedness - Supplementary 
feeding programmes arc an activity that is always required in a refugee camp 
environment. It serves to protect the vulnerable groups but also is can 
ideal programme for delivery of other services such as preventive health and 
medical programmes, health surveillance activities, public health education, 
and monitoring of the basic ration distribution. Normally HCR vri.ll contract 
a voluntary agency or the host government to provide this service. As 
important as these programme are, HCR personnel must be conversant v/ith the 
basic issues involved in setting up s.nd running such a programme. In order 
to be properly prepared for selecting the appropriate agency and seeing that 
adequate programmes are established, HCR should take the followin'' steps:
a. Provide the Branch Office with literature on the establishment and 
operation of these programmes. Suitable references for non-medical and 
-nutrition personnel are available.
* b. Establish close linkages with agencies that are recognized specialists
in this type of programme and contract them at early stages of the emergency 
to provide advice on setting up the programmes,
c. Develop model standards which can be used or adapted to guide agencies 
in setting up programmes. (The standards developed in Thailand (UNHCR, 1980) 
provide a current example.)
d. Establish 0. closer link to WFP and WHO emergency operations personnel 
who are specifically concerned with this activity,
e. Develop a mechanism whereby a nutritionist/fceding programme 
specialist can be seconded quickly to the Branch Office to assist in deter­
mining the scope of the required programme. (At present this is left to 
WFP, but often they do not assign an experienced specialist. Thus HCR 
should have the capability to provide this expertise if WFP cannot.)
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In order to nerve as a back-up feeding eye tern capable of smoothing out 
temporary shortages end insuring that the vulnerable groups will always have 
adecruate food, the supplementary feeding programme should receive separate 
stocks of food. If possible, independent supplies should be established.
The best way this can be effectively accomplished, is to utilize the ''food 
agencies" that ha.ve their own sources of supply and their own logistics.
HCR should develop standing agreements with those groups to provide stand-by 
services in emergencies.
3. Intensive feeding
Lessons learned and implications for emergency preparedness - HCR Branch 
Offices can be made more conversant with this type of programme by provision 
of the available, non-technical literature a.s well as a guide to the basic 
issues. Information regarding all types of feeding programmes and the 
conditions when they are required should be a part of UNHCR sta.ff training.
D. Health programs
Lessons learned and implications for omergonev oronarednoss - IICR field 
staff are generally unprepared to deal with health-related pro;;romines, 
end specifically they are not conversant with the issues related to preven­
tive vs. curative health programmes. To hcalp field staff become more pro­
ficient in these areas, UNHCR should:
a. Provide basic background data, relating to the issues surrounding 
health progr-mines and priorities in emergencies and refugee camps. This 
data could be presented in a handbook for field officers and included, in a 
staff training programme.
b. Set up a regular seminar programme with the WHO Emergency Relief 
Operations Division to provide orientation on health matters to HQ staff 
likely to be sent on missions.
To help ensure that the voluntary agencies working with UNHCR a,re 
qualified, greater participation of the WHO Emergency Relief Operations 




Lessone learned and implications for emergency preparedness - The recep­
tion and processing: of new arrivals, and special programmes for unaccompanied 
minors, are two services for which preparedness activities arc needed at 
the outset of emergency operations. Simple systems for reception end pro­
cessing have been worked out and the necessary cards for registration can 
he developed in advance and included in an Emergency Operations Handbook 
for field officers so that, when an emergency occurs, the forms can be 
translated and produced locally. Experience has shown that, if proper 
registration is not carried out at an early stage, family reunions, the 
tracing of unaccompanied minors, and the problem of re-establishment of 
families within a refugee camp will all be delayed - indeed, in many cases 
prevented. A model record-keeping system should he developed which follows 
each refugee from his arrival to the final destination, with copies of the 
information collected in a central data center. HCR can help deal with this 
type of situation by providing this model system as wel 1 as guidance to its 
counterparts and implementing agencies at the earliest stages of the emergency.
Unaccompanied minors are always one of the most sensitive social problems 
of refugees. Special systems are required to register and trace unaccompanieds 
and in many situations special attention is necessary'- to ensure that the 
children receive adequate care. As mentioned earlier, in Somalia the 
problem does not appear to be great; few children arrive unaccompanied by
their parents, and normally, if the parents are missing, other relatives 
are usually present. Experience from other locations, however, most 
recently Thailand, shows the need for HCR to he prepared, not only with 
systems of registration and child care hut also with formulated policies 
relating to child care under these circumstances. Field officers should 
be made aware of the issues related to unaccompanieds and the HCR branch 
Office should be prepared to move rapidly to act in the children's interests.
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F. Personal supplies
Lessons learned end implications for emergency preparedness - In order 
to "be properly prepared to deal with personal material needs, UNHCR should 
explore the following options:
a. Re-orient the purchasing system to allow for a greater level of 
localized purchases.
b. Conduct an investigation into the actual personal material aid 
requirements (by assessing what was used and how it was used in UNHCR's
past experience) and develop material acquisition plans based on this report.
c. Where personal items are shown to be required in a certain region, 
UNHCR should develop lists of local supplies and keep them updated on a 
regular basis.
I
